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Abstract 
  When honey bees transport pollen across citrus orchards they can increase the number of 
seeds in varieties that remain seedless otherwise.  An increase in seeds diminishes the market 
value of the fruit creating an externality between seedless growers and beekeepers.  This paper 
investigates the efficiency of different policy resolution of this externality including a range of 
regulated spatial segregations of beekeeping and seedless farming with or without financial 
compensations.  
We develop a spatial model of honey foraging behavior to quantify the efficiencies and 
redistributions of different policies that may be used to correct this market failure.  Some of these 
policies have been implemented others are being currently discussed in policy debates in the 
California citrus belt.   
This paper illustrates that quantifying biophysical processes that create externalities is a 
necessary step towards evaluating the economics efficiency of alternative solutions.  
Introduction 
  The canonical example of positive externalities is pollination of tree crops by honey bees 
as cited by Meade and others.  As pointed out by Chueng and others generally, the benefits are 
internalized and the pollination market is well developed.  However, pollination can create a 
negative externality that can become in some circumstances a significant issue.  Pollination can 
reduce the quality and the market value of crops.  This is the case with many seedless mandarin 
varieties.  In absence of cross-pollination with other citrus, clementine and W. Murcott Afourer 
varieties are seedless and thus more highly valued by consumers. If both honey bees and other 
varieties of citrus (including tangelo, lemon, or other mandarins) are present in the vicinity of 
seedless orchards these mandarins become seedy and lose their quality premium.  The externality 3 
 
comes from the transport of pollen from other citrus orchards by bees into orchards intended to 
produce seedless fruits.  This externality has become a major concern for both seedless mandarin 
growers and beekeepers operating in the citrus belt of Valencia in Spain and California in the 
United States.  Heated policy debates are ongoing.  California seedless citrus growers support a 
regulatory approach that would exclude bee hives from all locations within 2 miles of a seedless 
orchard, an option close to the one currently being used in Spain.  Beekeepers, who would lose 
many valuable locations for their hives, oppose this policy. These beekeepers have been 
operating for decades before seedless citrus and hence claim they are protected under the Right 
to Farm Act.  They also claim that flight patterns of bees are not controllable and have 
established rights to roam.   
  Externalities related to pollen transport are not new and a large literature exists on the 
problem of seed certification (Hokanson, Grumet, and Hancock (1997)).  Much attention has 
been paid recently to pollen drift in genetically modified crop such as corn, but the issue has also 
been studied in the forestry industry or in sunflower seed production and certification.  These 
externalities are generated from the uncontrolled dispersion of pollen and the vicinity of 
compatible crops with different genetic material.  Wind is the most frequent vector of pollen 
dispersion for species with small pollen size.  In such cases the only decisions that influence the 
presence and extent of the externality are planting decisions by neighboring farmers. In the case 
of seedless citrus, the magnitude of the externality is determined both by the vicinity of cross 
compatible varieties of citrus and by the distribution of honey bees in the crops.  The fact that 
beekeepers indirectly control the vector of pollen is crucial in the determination of the efficiency 
of different externality resolutions. 4 
 
  In Spain, a segregation policy with compensation has been chosen where beekeepers are 
excluded from seedless growing areas and compensated for their loss.  The objective of this 
paper is first to evaluate the policy option and rank them for the California Citrus Belt, and 
second to identify in which way the Spanish situation may differ.  We rank the different policy 
options according to their benefits to the different groups of farmers as well as using an 
estimated social welfare gain that includes consumers of honey, citrus both seedless and seedy, 
and almonds which depend exclusively on honey bees for their pollination.  The economic 
importance of almond production is strikingly different between Spain and California which may 
explain different optimal policies. 
  We first review the economics of the seedless externality issue in California before 
turning to a description of our modeling approach.  Our model combines an ecological model of 
bee foraging behavior with an economic analysis of the costs and benefits of beekeeping and 
seedless production.  We show that explicitly taking the spatial nature of the externality into 
account is crucial to evaluating policies. We then present our simulation results before 
concluding and making policy recommendations for the California citrus belt.   
Background 
  The California citrus belt is located in the southern San Joaquin Valley. It contained 
about 242,044 bearing acres in 2005 (USDA 2006). The break up in the main types is presented 
in table 1 along with the acreages of seedless varieties. 
  The current acreage of bearing seedless varieties is quite small relative to the total 
acreage of citrus but seedless orchards are rapidly expanding as the acreage of non-bearing 
acreage shows.  5 
 
  Among the varieties of Tangerines grown in California, the seedless varieties are the 
W.Murcott Afourer, the Fina Sodea/Clementine, the Clemenules, the Marisol, and a few other 
varieties of Clementines.  The acreage for seedless shown in table 1 is the sum of the acreages 
for these varieties.  Their fruits do not set seed unless pollen from compatible citrus is 
transported into the orchards.  Compatible citrus varieties include some the seedless varieties 
themselves (see Kahn (2007) for an introduction to the biology of seedless citrus).  Extension 
research recommends the use of other citrus such as navel oranges and Satsuma mandarins as 
buffer between compatible varieties (Chao (2004)).  The current acreage of seedless citrus may 
allow the use of buffer rows to limit cross-pollination but as research on gene flows has shown 
that recommended buffers might be sufficient to avoid seedy fruits.  In addition, as acreage of 
seedless expands buffer strategies may not be sufficient. 
  Planting decisions and policies that affect planting decisions such as zoning are possible 
tools for resolving the cross-pollination but we focus here instead on a possibly cheaper and 
more efficient set of policies that control pollen flow directly.  Accordingly, we take acreage 
decisions as given and focus on the interaction between established seedless growers and 
beekeepers operating in their vicinity.  
For that reason, our modeling focuses on the externality between seedless growers and 
beekeepers and leaves other citrus growers out of the picture.  This simplification is reasonable 
given two facts.  First, in the current policy debates the two main sides are the seedless growers 
and the beekeepers and seedy citrus growers are somewhat neutral, even though they do get 
some benefit from letting beekeepers operate on their farms.  The second fact is that even if 
acreage of seedless orchards is increasing rapidly it still represents only a fraction of the citrus 
acreage with about 5% as presented in table 1.  In this paper we take orchard maps as given and 6 
 
only consider the decision of the number and locations of hives as a control variable.  Our first 
step is to understand and propose solutions for the externality in the short run even though 
planting decisions both determine the size of the externality and depend on the outcome of the 
current negotiations.  Indeed, if the rights to place hives in any location were given to 
beekeepers, the net return to seedless farming would decrease and seedless orchards might be 
relocated or disappear altogether. 
Combining a Foraging  Model and an Economic Model 
  Honey bees (Apis mellifera) differ from solitary bees and other pollinators by their ability 
to gather information about forage resource and make collective foraging decision.  The 
mechanisms of information sharing are well documented (Seeley (1994)).  Hives send scouts to 
evaluate forage sources (pollen and nectar mainly) and allocate their foragers’ efforts to the 
patches with highest returns.  An extensive literature exists on the behavior of hives and bees and 
on the decision rules of individuals that generate the collective foraging patterns observed both in 
experimental and natural settings (e.g. Waddington et al. (1994), Biesmeijer J.C.,. Ermers 
(1999)).  We use the decision rules from that literature and from the central foraging literature 
(Pyke (1984)) to develop a spatially explicit model of hive foraging in an agricultural landscape.  
Behavior of individual hives is however insufficient to derive foraging patterns at a landscape 
level when the density of bees is of the same order of magnitude as the forage density (de Vries 
and Biesmeijer (1994)).  Indeed, the bee foraging literature says much about the decisions that 
one hive makes to choose on which patch to allocate effort, but less on how several hives 
interact.  The consensus in the entomology literature and from entomologists’ opinion is that 
when resources are not extremely scarce, bees do not enter in physical competition or exculsion 
and do not actively develop foraging territories.  Instead, competition is mainly indirect through 7 
 
depletion or mining of the forage.  Accordingly, we develop a model of forage mining by hives 
in an agricultural landscape. 
  The initial data of the simulation model is a map of crops and hive locations.  Each crop 
provides a certain density of forage that can by depleted by bees as they forage.  In the citrus 
belt, we assume that all types of citrus provide the same amount of forage per acre, with no 
spatial heterogeneity.  We also assume homogenous hives.  Our default value for hives is of 50 
000 bees with up to a third of foragers.  We simplify the modeling of information gathering by 
assuming that our simple landscape all hives spend a fixed and identical proportion of their bees 
on scouting and transmit that information to all foragers with the result that bees have perfect 
information about the forage in each patch at every time. 
  The sequence of the simulation is as follows.  Hives only dispose of a set flight time to 
collect the forage determined by temperature and humidity.  This foraging period is split into 
rounds.  At each round, each hive decides which patch to forage according to a cost minimizing 
rule and allocates the foragers present in the hive at that time accordingly.  The cost of foraging a 
patch is a function of the distance from the hive to the patch and of the density of forage at that 
patch.  As forage decreases on one patch, it becomes increasingly time consuming for a forager 
to collect one load of forage. After each round, the forage on the entire landscape is updated to 
reflect the loads collected by the different hives.  Bees return to the hive after the number of 
rounds it takes them to collect their load, i.e. the cost of foraging.  The simulation starts with a 
map of forage that is progressively mined until the flight time is up. 
  Our model has several limitations.  First it assumes homogeneity of both hives and forage 
(within on orchard).  It also does not allow to account for variability in biophysical parameters 8 
 
that can affect the foraging range of bees, such as wind, roads etc… However, it captures 
important spatial features of published data since we calibrate it on such data (Gary, Witherell, 
and Lorenzen.(1976)).  Further experiments will be required to validate or invalidate the 
predictions of our simulations. 
  Pollination and cross-pollination are the result of foraging.  Every time a bee collects 
forage from a flower, it leaves some pollen that was incidentally gathered from previous visits to 
flowers or from contact with pollen stored in the hive.  We estimate cross-pollination by 
assuming that when visiting a flower each bee leaves pollen from different citrus varieties 
according to the relative amount of pollen from each variety collected by the hive at that point in 
time.  The output of the foraging model is a range of foraging for each hive.  These ranges are 
used to generate a measure of cross-pollination.  In the extreme case where all foraging ranges 
are within orchards with no overlap, no cross-pollination occurs since no pollen is transported to 
seedless varieties.  In that situation, each hive only contains pollen from one variety.  However, 
in some hives at least forage in different orchards generating cross-pollination.   
  This first foraging model provides a measure of the degree of cross-pollination using 
maps of orchard planting and hive locations.  The second part of our modeling exercise is to find 
the economic costs and benefits associated with the initial maps and the cross-pollination 
outcomes.  On the beekeepers side, we estimate a net revenue per hive which is generated from 
locating the hive in a citrus orchards.  For citrus growers who do not grow seedless varieties, 
there is little benefit to having hives in their orchards, and accordingly, they usually charge a 
small fee or receive honey from the beekeepers.  There is no strong evidence that bees improve 
citrus crops, as opposed to watermelons or cherry tomatoes for example where honey bees are 
not necessary for pollination but have been shown to increase fruit set and fruit quality.   9 
 
Accordingly we assume that for beekeepers the revenues derived from using citrus orchards are 
to find a good location to maintain hives after the almond pollination season and to possibly 
produce citrus flavored honey that can be sold for a premium.  Since it is difficult to estimate a 
value per hive for citrus orchard locations we carry an extensive sensitivity analysis on this 
parameter.  On the seedless grower side, the loss due to the occurrence of cross-pollination is 
easier to estimate since market prices provide an estimate of the premium for seedless fruit. We 
assume that a few seed only suffice to lose the premium. 
  As noted earlier, this paper does not consider policies that affect planting decisions such 
as zoning and focuses on policies that affect hive locations and transport of pollen.  The simplest 
way of making sure that no cross pollination occurs would be to remove all hives within the 
flight range of seedless orchards.  Seedless growers support a policy that would establish the 
legal limit at 2 miles.  We evaluate both a policy that ensures that seedless orchards are not 
within flight range of bees and a policy with a 2 mile radius of exclusion.  Although the 2 mile 
radius seems a reasonable distance to reduce bee visitation, there is some evidence that flight 
ranges can exceed 5 miles, depending on the flight conditions, landscape characteristics and 
forage density.  Comparing these two strict-exclusion policies allows first to evaluate the 
relevance of the 2 mile figure and second, to give an upper bound to the cost of solving the 
externality.  Indeed, strict exclusion, a policy that would reduce seed set as much as possible 
does not take into account the opportunity cost of lost hive locations for beekeepers and does not 
allow for any trade off. 
  The second set of policies, is one where the trade offs are fully considered, either through 
an hypothetical market-based mechanisms between growers and beekeepers or thought some 
taxation mechanism.  We use an optimization algorithm to find the optimal limit of exclusion of 10 
 
hives allowing for some level of seeds in mandarins.  This is the standard economic concept of 
equating marginal cost to marginal benefits, where the costs are opportunity costs of loosing hive 
locations for beekeepers and the benefits the increased market value of seedless fruits.  This 
policy provides a picture of a spatial marginal cost-marginal benefit frontier.  We also investigate 
the effects of non-zero transaction costs on this efficiency frontier. 
  The last policy considered is one where we take advantage of the partial exclusion of 
foraging range that hive show in experimental data (Gary, Witherell, and Lorenzen(1976)).   
When hives are placed inside seedless orchards, the forage inside the orchard is depleted, 
possibly before the arrival of bees from hives outside the orchards, which reduces the gains for 
these outside bees to forage and cross-pollinate.  This solution is not an exclusion of bees but a 
segregation of bees, one group foraging a seedless variety only, another foraging outside the 
orchard only.  To the extent that this segregation is possible, this solution neither limits the use of 
hive locations nor produces seedy fruits.  We show have the efficiency of this policy depends on 




The results and methods of this paper carry beyond the current debate between seedless 
citrus growers and beekeepers in California.  First, beekeepers everywhere are concerned by the 
precedent that California’s policy might set.  Second, our contribution points at the lack of 
empirically sound pollination strategies from the economics literature.  The seedless case 
represents merely a fraction of the externalities related to pollination in agricultural landscapes. 11 
 
The Conservation Reserve Program has been recently modified to include the value pollination 
for prioritization of conservation contracts.  Sound pollination management strategies for both 
managed and wild pollinators will require contributions from entomologist, ecologists, and 
economists.  Finally, our case study illustrates some of the gains obtained from coupling 
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Table 1: Citrus Acreage in 2005 in the California Citrus Belt. 
Bearing Non-Bearing  Total 
Grapefruit  7,700 703 8,403 
Lemons  42,930 3,287 46,217 
Limes  365 30 395 
Oranges, Navel  128,155 11,888 140,043 
Oranges Valencia  48,761 402 49,163 
Pummelos  1,929 113 2,042 
Tangerines  12,204 11,834 24,038 
Total  242,044 28,257 270,301 
Seedless 







Source: USDA (2006). 
 
Table 2: Surplus Changes Comparison for different policy alternatives. 
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